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ARTEM BOROVIK, The Hidden War: A Russian Journalist's Account of the Soviet War in
Afghanistan (London: Faber and Faber, 1990). Pp. 288.
VLADIMIR KUZICHKIN, Inside the KGB: Myth and Reality (Andrew Deutsch, 1990). Pp. 406.
LOUISE D'ESTRANGE FAWCETT, Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Pp. 239.
REVIEWED BY FRED HALLIDAY, Department of International Relations, London School of
Economics, U.K.
The first two of these books, although contrasting in style and provenance, combine to give
a fascinating and in the main convincing picture of Soviet involvement with two neighbor-
ing states in the 1980s, Afghanistan and Iran. Taken together they should form part of the
literature on Soviet policy towards what in the West was called "the northern tier" (in Rus-
sian sredni vostok, or Central East, as distinct from the more remote Arab lands of the
blizhni vostok or Middle East).
The first book, on Afghanistan, is by a journalist on the weekly Ogonyok and is an exam-
ple of glasnost at work within the former USSR. It took somewhat longer for glasnost to
affect Soviet accounts of international, as opposed to domestic topics, but once it happened
a great deal was revealed; by 1988 "international glasnost" had arrived in the form of more
open, honest, and factual accounts of Soviet foreign policy and of criticism of old ideas and
modes of expression, as well as of former allies who had hitherto been treated with care.
The second book, by Vladimir Kuzichkin, is more old fashioned. It contains the memoirs
of a KGB agent posted to Iran from 1977 to 1982, before his defection to the West and it
too tells us a lot—as much about the workings of the Soviet state as about Iran. As with all
defectors, there is evidence of concealment and an element of distortion, but the underlying
story rings true.
Borovik's account of Afghanistan has often been compared to Michael Herr's Dispatches,
and with some justification. It is a vivid, soldier's eye view of the war, with its pain, its
maimings, its intolerable waits, its petty gains and losses, its bitter slang. Quarrels abound
with officers and soldiers of other ethnic groups, and with busy-bodies sent from home. If
there is no repetition of the mutilation of corpses and collections of hewn-off parts of the
anatomy as recorded by Herr, it still records many cases of brutality towards the civilian
population (one Soviet officer is quoted as praising Lieutenant Calley, the villain of My
Lai). A gradual disillusionment of the Soviet soldiers with their leaders develops, but, as
with the generation who fought in Vietnam, it is often ambivalent, both questioning the
need for the war and its internationalist justifications, and criticizing the officials at home
for not doing more to back the military on the ground.
As in Herr's Vietnam, so in Borovik's Afghanistan, the local political protagonists re-
main shadowy. There is the odd direct account of the mujahedin forces, and there was, on
the evidence, a lot more negotiation over truces, prisoners, and food supplies between the
Russians in Afghanistan and the guerrillas than there ever was in Vietnam. The Kabul re-
gime's forces make the odd entry: there is little enthusiasm for their cause amongst the Rus-
sians, and Borovik, like all other observers, seems to have assumed the regime would
collapse immediately after the Russian forces left. That it did not was of little comfort to
the Russians, most of whom only wished to forget the place.
To anyone who was in Afghanistan in the early 1980s, before glasnost came about, this
book has a particular fascination. In Kabul in late 1980 it was impossible to have any direct
contact with Soviet forces: there were no trips to outposts or embattled positions, and even
the figures for troop numbers and for casualties were suppressed. Military briefings had a
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particularly generic air about them, officials confining themselves to vague assertions that
the "bandits" were being overcome. About the only hard fact I could get out of Soviet
officials at the embassy was that hepatitis was killing more troops than the war, a discovery
that I noticed recurred, after I had reported it, in many U.S. official briefings for years after-
wards. Borovik provides no overall analysis of the war, but he does take one to heart, the
pained ambivalence of the Soviet soldiers. In the end it was not just their faith in the Af-
ghan intervention and the role of the "limited contingent" within it that was shattered, but
also the overall confidence in the secularizing, internationalist, and modernizing project of
the Soviet Union. As he himself suggests, Afghanistan had something of the same impact,
if less powerful one, on the regime's self-confidence as the Japanese defeat had on the czar-
ist forces in 1905.
Kuzichkin's narrative is altogether less vivid but nonetheless powerful. He has, in es-
sence, two messages. One concerns the Soviet state itself—its pervasive corruption and in-
efficiency, and the rivalry between the party's Central Committee, which sought to direct all
international activity, and the more professional and judicious KGB. For Kuzichkin, the
party is the source of corruption in the system, and he classes himself amongst those more
educated younger people who initially hoped the system could reform itself. Not implausi-
bly, he says that he attached great importance to the emergence of Solidarity in Poland in
the period 1979-81: its crushing in December 1981 destroyed the hopes of his generation,
much as the crushing of the Prague Spring had done for an earlier generation in 1968. His
decision to defect to the West in 1982, by crossing the land frontier from Iran to Turkey at
the post of Bazargan, followed from this disillusion.
On his other topic, Iran, Kuzichkin's account is of considerable atmospheric interest, but
it contains little new in substance beyond the claim that the KGB made a secret but fruitless
contact with Khomeini when the latter was still in Najaf. Life in the Soviet community in
Tehran was obviously preferable to that back home, and there is much discussion of the
infighting and corruption between the various individuals and institutions involved. The
main Soviet espionage ring, around General Mogarebi, was broken up in 1977 and, by his
account, the KGB and the embassy were ill-prepared for the revolution that began in 1978.
They were involved in helping the Tudeh party to reestablish itself after decades in exile,
but their attempts to establish links with the Mujahedin-i Khalq guerrillas collapsed when
Saadati, their contact in the organization, was arrested and subsequently executed by the
new regime.
As time passed, the Soviet position became more and more beleaguered: they were ter-
rified that the Islamic radicals would do to them what they had done to the U.S. embassy,
and hold the personnel hostage; hostile surveillance, and pass protests, hemmed the em-
bassy in; the Tudeh, despite its attempts to ingratiate itself with Khomeini, was crushed by
the regime, and the USSR, for all its protests, was unable to do anything to help them.
Like all defectors' accounts, Kuzichkin's has to be treated with some caution. His mem-
oirs are rather like those of Anatoly Shevchenko, the former U.N. official who published his
Breaking with Moscow some years ago: probably 80 percent truth, 10 percent exaggeration,
10 percent politically motivated fable. In Kuzichkin's case some points are rather obviously
questionable: his claim to provide an account of the decision making behind the 1979 inter-
vention in Afghanistan is hard to believe, since it is improbable that he, a not very senior
KGB official, could have known what went on in such detail; his analysis of the Tudeh par-
ty's relationship with the Khomeini regime is unsound, since the real repression came in
1983, after Kuzichkin had left. On two issues he is suspiciously silent. One is his own role
in the Tudeh's fall—it was reported in the Western press at the time that Kuzichkin had
handed lists of Tudeh infiltrators to the British who had then passed them on to the Islamic
Republic: while this may have been deliberately misleading, it needed comment. The second
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issue on which he is silent is the Soviet role in frustrating the U.S. attempt to free the hos-
tages in April 1980, the Tabas raid. Again, press reports after the event said that Moscow
had tipped off then President Bani Sadr about this. No comment is not enough.
These revelations are, of course, accounts of what is now a bygone age. The KGB, the
"limited contingent" and indeed the Communist party of the Soviet Union are no more. The
Bolshevik revolution's approximately seventy-year interaction with the northern tier is over,
and Russia for the first time in centuries no longer has a common frontier with the Middle
East. Despite enormous amounts of propaganda on both sides—for and against commu-
nism—what is most striking about the overall record is how unsuccessful Soviet forays to
the south were. We can only recall the telegrammed message which Victor Serge in his
Memoirs of a Revolutionary recalls Lenin sending to Blumkin, the Comintern agent in the
Gilan republic in northern Iran, in 1920: "All return home. Revolution in Iran now off."
If the Gilan republic was the first great instance of this, and the Afghani intervention the
third, the second was Stalin's foray into Iran, initially in collaboration with the British, in
1941. The postwar crisis this occasioned in 1946, was the first great international episode in
the cold war. As part of this story, Louise Fawcett's analysis of the 1946 Azerbayjani crisis
is an important and lucid one: basing herself on a wider range of documentary materials
than any previous historian, and analyzing the story at both the level of great power conflict
and of intra-Iranian politics, she shows how Stalin was outmaneuvered by the Shah and by
the Truman administration and was forced to abandon what were, in effect, Azerbayjani and
Kurdish safe havens in the north of the country. She is particularly interesting on the com-
plex relations between the Pishevari regime in Tabriz and the Russians, but shows how,
whatever the depth of an indigenous Azerbayjani political movement, it was subordinated
throughout to great-power considerations.
The Azerbayjani question has been noticeably absent from the more recent Islamic Rev-
olution and its aftermath and there seems, as yet, to be little enthusiasm in southern—i.e.,
Iranian—Azerbayjan for unification with the now independent republic to the north; this is
in contrast to the situation to the east, in the Tajik areas of Afghanistan, where some Tajiks
seem to have entertained thoughts of uniting with the new Tajik republic. The contrast be-
tween the very real sense of Azerbayjani separateness shown in the 1946 crisis, and the ab-
sence of it in and after the revolution in 1978-79, underlines, however, how contingent
these expressions of self-determination often are. The reason why Iranian Azerbayjanis
seem to prefer to stay as they are is above all because they reckon they are better off in a
larger Iran than in a smaller and probably more impoverished independent state. This
"Puerto Rican" calculation may not, of course, last forever. The frontier, political and cul-
tural, between Russia and the Muslim south has been fluid for some centuries: in this per-
spective the Bolshevik revolution may just have frozen for a period of a few decades a
process of interaction and change that has been in progress for hundreds of years, and
which shows no sign of abating.
DARYUSH SHAYEGAN, Qu'est-ce qu'une revolution religieuse? (Paris: Albin Michel, 1991).
Pp. 266.
REVIEWED BY PATRICK D. GAFFNEY, Department of Anthropology, University of Notre Dame,
Notre Dame, Ind.
The title of this provocative study poses a topical question in the broadest of terms. But the
response that follows is considerably more specific. Although Professor Shayegan fre-
quently generalizes to suggest that his answer has global implications, there is no mistaking
